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Introduction 
 In 1998, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly referred to as the Declaration on 
Human Rights Defenders. This event was a milestone in the emergence of a sub-regime for the 
protection of Human Rights Defenders (Bennett et al. 2015, 883) within the human rights international 
regime – which is “a framework of rules, norms, principles, and procedures for negotiation” (Keohane 
1982, 337). 
 The term 'human rights defender' (HRD) was defined by the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights as "any person or group of persons working to promote human rights, 
ranging from intergovernmental organizations based in the world's largest cities to individuals working 
within their local communities" (2004, 6). Therefore, anyone can be an HRD, regardless of their 
profession, provided that they engage in some sort of human rights activity. The UN General Assembly 
considered that there is a special need to protect the rights of this category of people as their activity 
often puts them at risk. Threats to HRDs can be of many different types: "executions, torture, beatings, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, death threats, harassment and defamation, as well as restrictions on their 
freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly" (Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2004, 10). Their persecutors can be state actors, such as the police, security services 
or local authorities, or non-state actors, such as armed groups or transnational corporations (Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004, 15–16). 
The Declaration on HRDs does not create any new right, but rather explicitly reaffirm the human 
rights of people who themselves defend human rights, thus making it easier to condemn any attack 
against them. However, as most resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the Declaration on 
Human Rights Defenders is a non-binding instrument. The General Assembly (1998) "invites 
Governments, agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations to intensify their efforts to disseminate the Declaration and to promote 
universal respect and understanding thereof". In addition to the fact sheet of the Office of the UN High 
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Commissioner for Human Rights (2004) clarifying the terms of the Declaration and providing tools for 
implementation, the European Union (EU) adopted its own Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders with 
the purpose of "ensuring protection" and providing "practical suggestions for enhancing EU action in 
relation to this issue" (2008). As recently as 2014, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights published a similar text, the OSCE Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights 
Defenders. 
 All these subsequent texts show that there is a real problem of implementation of the 
Declaration. Despite noticeable efforts to make the rights of HRDs more easily and practically 
enforceable, such international norms remain non-binding towards states. States are responsible for the 
protection of their citizens, and they are the best able to protect HRDs effectively. Unfortunately, in 
many regions of the world, national governments are also the primary violators of human rights (Keck 
and Sikkink 1999, 93; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004, 15). Bennett 
(2015) notices gaps in implementation not only from authoritarian governments who persecute HRDs, 
but also from European governments who fail to integrate the EU Guidelines on HRDs into their foreign 
policies. 
This is why the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), defined as "private sector 
associations based in civil society pursuing policy advocacy goals and project management" (Kurian 
and Alt 2011, 1117), is so crucial in areas where states fail to honour their responsibility or their 
commitments, as it is often the case for human rights. Since the 1990s, concurrent with the emergence 
of an international regime for HRDs, a number of international NGOs – defined for the purpose of this 
study as NGOs working on a global scale – have started to specialise in the protection of HRDs at risk. 
The key role of NGOs in the global society has been thoroughly analysed by Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) as they developed their theory on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). This theory looks 
into the way local civil society organizations in the global South and large international NGOs work 
together to promote a cause and bring about policy change. Transnational advocacy networks are then 
"actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89). TANs 
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usually seek to "mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to 
persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments" 
(Ibid.). 
According to Keck and Sikkink, the protection of human rights is one of the issue areas that are 
typically conducive to the formation of TANs (93). Indeed, they explain that there is a need for TANs 
when local activists cannot make their voice heard "within domestic political or judicial arenas" (Ibid.) 
because of some connections between the government and the perpetrators. Sometimes the government 
is the perpetrator, and other times it simply refuses to recognize violations and to protect the victims. 
According to the logic of the "boomerang pattern", an efficient solution is for the local activists to engage 
with other organisations with similar goals outside their country, who will be able to mobilise resources 
in order to persuade powerful states or organisations to pressurize the violator or non-cooperative state 
into changing behaviour (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13). 
This function of TANs is what explains the choice of the term "advocacy" to qualify these 
transnational networks. They are composed of advocates, "individuals advocating policy changes that 
cannot be easily linked to their 'interests'" as they "plead the causes of others" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 
91). TANs' stakeholders work together in order to join forces and speak with a common voice, a voice 
that will be strong enough to compel perpetrators to end violations, or to persuade powerful actors to 
compel them. For Keck and Sikkink, the best way in which international NGOs can support local 
activists dealing with human rights violations is to use their transnational connections to build a 
compelling advocacy directed towards powerful states and intergovernmental organisations. 
This research aims at testing this hypothesis in the context of the security issues faced by HRDs. 
Most of the time, it is impossible for persecuted HRDs to seek the help of their own government. As a 
consequence, and in accordance with Keck and Sikkink's predictions, these HRDs often turn to 
international NGOs for support. However, which tactic is more effective for NGOs seeking to protect 
HRDs: transnational advocacy or local support? 
There is much debate about the outcome of human rights advocacy campaigns. On the 3rd of 
March 2016, the Honduran indigenous leader Berta Caceres was assassinated. She was one of the most 
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prominent environmental and indigenous rights defenders in Honduras, and yet this publicity seems to 
have put her at risk rather than deterring her persecutors. Even in cases where an HRD is freed or 
successfully protected as a result of an advocacy campaign, this individual case does not guarantee the 
security of other HRDs working in the same or different settings. Nor does it guarantee the security of 
this particular HRD in the future, once the general public and powerful actors turn their attention away. 
Such campaigns are based on a 'naming and shaming' strategy, which is to "target some nations for 
particular attention and condemnation in the hope that through such publicity, these governments will 
be pressured into changing their abusive practices" (Meernik et al. 2012, 234). However, Hafner-Burton 
(2008) showed that 'naming and shaming' campaigns are not likely to bring about a general improvement 
in the human rights practices of the targeted government. 
If, thanks to transnational networks, international NGOs are in connection with local activists 
who need help, and if the outcome of advocacy is so uncertain, why would they try to convince reluctant 
governments to change, instead of trying to directly improve the situation of these HRDs? Keck and 
Sikkink see transnational networks as great opportunities for isolated activists to raise their issue to a 
higher level, to bring it from the ground to the attention of powerful actors in the highest political 
spheres. I argue that they overlook another type of opportunities that transnational networks offer – the 
opportunity to transmit information and resources from the top down. The goal of NGOs working in 
HRD protection is to reduce the risks local HRDs face. Working through advocacy and relying on 
intermediaries might not be the most simple or efficient way to do so. 
Protecting HRDs means reducing the risk they are exposed to. The level of risk is a function of 
three components: threats, vulnerabilities and capacities (Martin and Eguren 2009, 140). Threats, 
defined as "the possibility that someone will harm somebody else‘s physical or moral integrity or 
property through purposeful and often violent action" (Ibid.), is the most obvious one: an HRD who 
faces threats is more at risk than one who does not. However, no threat does not mean no risk. Indeed, 
many HRDs are extremely vulnerable due to the work they do – for example, defending oppressed 
minorities –, the places they go – for example, on a field mission in a remote area – or their lack of 
resources. These vulnerabilities – defined as "the degree to which people are susceptible to loss, damage, 
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suffering and death in the event of an attack" (141) – increase their level of risk, unless counterbalanced 
by significant capacities. Capacities are the "strengths and resources a group or defender can access to 
achieve a reasonable degree of security" (Ibid.), such as financial resources, protection tools, network, 
and public support. Threats are often difficult to control, but there are ways to reduce vulnerability 
factors and to develop protection capacities. 
This is precisely where international NGOs' support is crucial for defenceless local activists. 
Through the channels of transnational networks, they can provide HRDs with all kinds of information 
and tools that will enhance their capacities. Not only can they offer financial and material support, and 
respond to cases of serious and imminent threats by for instance facilitating the relocation of HRDs at 
risk, but they can also help HRDs to better protect themselves. They can inform HRDs about the various 
protection mechanisms available at the regional and international level that they can resort to. They can 
also deliver trainings on how to better assess the risk, how to develop a security plan and how to use 
protection tools. This kind of preventive action tends to have a more direct and lasting impact on the 
effective protection of HRDs than advocacy work, which is often a matter of communicating about 
threats or violations that are already happening. In addition, empowering human rights defenders is a 
long-term investment in the promotion of human rights in general, since more secure HRDs will be more 
able to achieve meaningful progress within their respective contexts. 
Therefore, if Keck and Sikkink observed that transnationalisation was transforming human 
rights work, they underestimated the extent of this change. Although their interest for transnational 
advocacy networks led them to emphasise the role of non-state actors, they still affirm that "states remain 
the major players internationally" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 217). Although they focus on the 
construction and the diffusion of ideas, values and norms, they still see power as the ultimate agent of 
change. They consider that the objective of human rights activists is to influence states' behaviour, and 
that convincing powerful actors is a necessity to bring about social change. Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
show how transnational networks allow local causes to be brought to the attention of international actors 
and forced upon states, but do not consider the possibility that the networks could actually allow activists 
to circumvent the states and bring change directly on the ground. 
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Human rights practitioners, on the other hand, did notice that. The approach focusing on the 
direct support, protection and empowerment of grassroots HRDs seems to be in practice what NGOs 
working in this field give more and more priority to. Mary Lawlor explains that she decided to leave 
Amnesty International to create a new NGO called Front Line Defenders, thus choosing to switch her 
focus from international advocacy to responding to "the needs of local HRDs as they, and only they, 
define them" (Lawlor and Anderson 2014, 9). Although international advocacy is usually still part of 
their work, these NGOs tend to give it a secondary role, for example to complement and consolidate 
their other projects. That is at least what stands out when observing the work of one of these NGOs from 
the inside. 
Indeed, this research will be based on my own experience of working in a human rights NGO, 
first as a master student carrying out a three-month internship, and later as a full staff member of the 
same organisation. Justice and Peace Netherlands (Justice and Peace or JP) is a small NGO based in The 
Hague which conducts various activities on an international scale. It will therefore be considered as part 
of the 'international NGOs' category for the purpose of this research. The main programme of the 
organisation is entitled 'Human Rights Defenders and Security', and includes several different projects 
all focusing on the protection of grassroots HRDs. The Shelter City Initiative is a temporary relocation 
programme which allows HRDs at risk to find refuge for three months in one of the eight participating 
cities in the Netherlands. The other main project is called 'The Hague Training Course for Human Rights 
Defenders on Security'. Twice a year, Justice and Peace invites about twenty HRDs from all over the 
world to The Hague for a ten-day training on physical, psychological and digital security, as well as 
advocacy and international protection mechanisms for HRDs. Besides these projects, JP also conducts 
lobbying and advocacy at the European level, with one of its employee being located in Brussels. 
As part of JP's team, I had the opportunity to observe the functioning of an NGO working 
transnationally with grassroots HRDs and local organisations from all over the world, but also with other 
international human rights NGOs and state actors such as the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 
field experience allowed me to develop an in-depth understanding of the relationships between all 
stakeholders, of the focus and content of their work, of the strategies they adopt and their reasons to do 
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so, and of the various constraints they encounter. Indeed, the 'participant-observation' method is ideal to 
provide "comprehensive understanding of a multifaceted phenomenon" such as transnationalisation 
(Eimer and Kranke 2015, 128). It allowed me to approach the theory of TANs with practical and tangible 
examples in mind. The participant observation will be complemented with other primary sources 
published by human rights NGOs and intergovernmental organisations working in the field of HRD 
protection. These sources include international norms, website pages, reports, project proposals, 
advocacy statements, events such as international conferences, workshops and trainings, and work tools 
as for example training manuals. Finally, I will make use of the available literature on the topics of 
transnational advocacy networks, NGO work, human rights and human rights defenders, which will be 
more extensively described in the following section. 
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The emergence of a theory on transnational activism  
Although the protection of HRDs is a growing field of activity in human rights work, this topic 
did not arise as a major field of study yet. The few scholars who have looked into the security situation 
of HRDs, such as Karen Benett, Alice Nah, Danna Ingleton, and James Savage (Bennett et al. 2015; 
Nah et al. 2013), have chosen to adopt a very practical approach. For instance, the Journal of Human 
Rights Practice's Special Issue on Human Rights Defenders was published in 2013 as a result of two 
international workshops gathering academics, practitioners and HRDs in order to "explore gaps in 
understanding and knowledge on the protection of HRDs" (Nah et al. 2013, 402). Another special issue 
dedicated to HRDs was published in 2015 by The International Journal of Human Rights. It offers 
"critical perspectives on the security and protection of human rights defenders" (Bennett et al. 2015), 
analysing the impact of existing protection mechanisms, highlighting innovative approaches for the 
protection of HRDs, and emphasising the need for further research on this topic. Finally, the University 
of York's Centre for Applied Human Rights focuses on "the real world challenges of putting 
human rights into practice and protecting human rights defenders at risk".1 
Therefore, the link between the work of NGOs focusing on the protection of HRDs and more 
general theories of international relations and human rights is yet to be explored. The literature on 
transnational human rights activism seems particularly relevant to this topic. Transnationalism is an 
approach focusing on cross-border interactions between non-state actors around the world: "ties that 
function across nation-states and the borders, laws, institutional frameworks, and identity narratives they 
represent" (Kurian and Alt 2011, 1684). As it is not always in the interest of states to promote and protect 
human rights, and as human rights are claimed to be universal and thus beyond national cultures, human 
rights is a typically transnational issue. Hence, a growing number of transnational social movements 
have emerged, forming what some scholars have called a "global civil society" (Lipschutz 1992). 
Scholars who research on transnational human rights activism try to understand "how universal 
principles and expanding communication opportunities serve as a basis for the creation and success of 
                                                     
1 ‘About Us - Centre for Applied Human Rights, The University of York’. York.ac.uk. 
https://www.york.ac.uk/cahr/about-us/ (June 3, 2016). 
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non-governmental advocacy networks" (Rodio and Schmitz 2010, 443). In the late 1990s, Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink developed a theory on transnational advocacy networks (TANs), that they 
exposed in their book Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998). 
The idea of transnational advocacy networks contrasts with more traditional understandings of 
international relations, particularly when it comes to the role of non-state actors, and that of ideas, norms 
and values in global politics. Indeed, the realist theory is based on a state-centred vision of international 
politics, in which everything, from foreign policy-making to the creation of international institutions, is 
the result of rational decisions made by self-interested states. Keck and Sikkink explicitly acknowledge 
their opposition with this view in the following statement: "The international system we present is made 
up not only of states engaged in self-help or even rule-governed behavior, but of dense webs of 
interaction and interrelations among citizens of different states which both reflect and help sustain shared 
values, beliefs and projects" (1998, 213). 
Therefore, Keck and Sikkink's approach is more closely related to the constructivist school of 
thought. Constructivist scholars argue that analysing social constructions, defined as "shared 
interpretations or ideas on how the material world is or should be ordered" (Kurian and Alt 2011, 324), 
is crucial to understand the international system and the behaviour of the various actors shaping it. Keck 
and Sikkink explain that TANs "fall outside our accustomed categories" (1998, 2) because of the type 
of actors they are composed of: individual activists who are not motivated by their own interest but by 
their dedication to a cause (214). Such actors would usually not have been deemed influential in the 
international arena, however Keck and Sikkink showed how they can benefit from collaborating 
transnationally in order to achieve common goals. 
 Keck and Sikkink define a transnational advocacy network (TAN) as "actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense 
exchanges of information and services" (1999, 89). TANs can involve a very diverse range of actors 
such as " international and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations; local social 
movements; foundations; the media; churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; 
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parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and parts of the executive and/or 
parliamentary branches of governments" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 9). 
 Activists work through TANs in order to raise an issue or a cause to the international level, to 
bring it to the attention of powerful organisations and governments, and eventually to bring about norm-
setting and policy change in this specific issue area (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89). In the field of human 
rights, the aim is usually to put pressure on powerful violators such as transnational corporations or 
repressive governments, and to persuade them to change their behaviour, thus following the "boomerang 
pattern" (1998, 12) previously mentioned. 
The core of the activities of TANs is the exchange of information and resources transnationally 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998, 2). More specifically, Keck and Sikkink distinguish four strategies commonly 
used by actors of TANs to achieve their goals. First, "information politics" focus on the mobilisation of 
information from the field, such as facts and testimonies, that can be used to strengthen international 
advocacy work (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95–96). The second strategy is called "symbolic politics", and 
it "calls upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is 
frequently far away" (95). "Leverage politics" consists in mobilising the power and resources of certain 
actors to influence other "target actors" and push for a change in a situation (97). Finally, "accountability 
politics" can be used to pressurize some actors such as governments to honour their commitments and 
to effectively implement "policies and principles they formally endorsed" (95). 
Keck and Sikkink also developed a typology of the effects of TANs with respect to their targets 
and their objectives. They identify five levels of influence (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 98). First, TANs 
raise awareness on an issue and contribute to frame it as "a matter of public debate". Then, they influence 
the "discursive positions" of powerful actors such as states and international organisations. The two 
following stages are the "influence on institutional procedures", and actual "policy change". Finally, a 
TAN has successfully influenced its targets if they have adapted their behaviour in practice, not only 
through formal commitments but also through effective implementation. 
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A transnational advocacy network for the protection of HRDs 
The purpose of this research is to examine the extent to which the theory of TANs is applicable 
to the case of NGO work for the protection of HRDs. The point here is not to completely dismiss Keck 
and Sikkink's analysis, which is very useful to understand the nature and content of the connections 
between various actors involved in human rights issues. Nor am I denying the existence of transnational 
advocacy networks as depicted by the two authors. Indeed, it seems that there is a transnational network 
for the protection of HRDs quite similar to Keck and Sikkink's model of TANs. 
The main actors involved in this network are domestic, regional and international human rights 
NGOs. Every human rights NGO deals with HRDs one way or another, since its own members are 
HRDs themselves. None the less, some organisations specialise specifically in the protection of human 
rights defenders. These include the international NGOs Front Line Defenders, Civil Rights Defenders, 
Protection International, Justice and Peace Netherlands, but also some regional organisations like the 
East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project. Domestic NGOs involved in the network 
rarely focus on the protection of HRDs, but as women's rights organisations, LGBTI organisations, 
environmental organisations, or any local organisation working on any human rights related issue, they 
can provide invaluable information on the living and working conditions of HRDs in various contexts. 
Other actors involved include parts of intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, and the EU 'ProtectDefenders' platform. Finally 
some national governments, especially through their embassies abroad, play a crucial role in project-
funding and in reporting on the situation of HRDs, as can also be the case for the media. 
All these stakeholders are connected to one another, and constantly exchanging information on 
the security issues faced by HRDs and on the best practices to protect them. From the 4th to the 7th of 
April 2016, two staff members of Justice and Peace joined the Defenders' Days in Sweden, a four-day 
conference organised by the NGO Civil Rights Defenders gathering "160 human rights defenders from 
35 countries, alongside leading human rights experts from all over the world".2 This event was a unique 
                                                     
2 ‘Defenders’ Days’. 2016. Defendersdays.civilrightsdefenders.org. 
https://defendersdays.civilrightsdefenders.org/ (March 6, 2016). 
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opportunity to meet some major players in the field of HRD protection such as Michel Frost, the current 
UN Special Rapporteur on HRDs, who was very interested to hear more about Justice and Peace's 
successful relocation programme – Shelter City. The Defenders' Days was also the occasion for Justice 
and Peace to get in contact and start a collaboration with the East and Horn of Africa HRDs Project, 
which can offer an alternative solution – regional relocation – for African HRDs at risk. Last February, 
Justice and Peace was also invited to the University of York for the launch of the HRD Hub, an 
"international network on HRD research".3 
Therefore, it is clear that Justice and Peace Netherlands (JP) is part of a transnational and multi-
sectoral network focusing on the protection of HRDs. Although NGOs form the backbone of this 
network, the role of state actors should not be overlooked. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds 
most of JP's projects, and staff members exchange information with the person in charge of HRDs at the 
Ministry on a regular basis. For its Shelter City project, Justice and Peace built a domestic network of 
Dutch cities willing to shelter an HRD, and is also part of a European network called the EU Human 
Rights Defenders Relocation Platform. It is interesting to note that the person coordinating this European 
Platform was formerly in charge of the Shelter City Initiative at Justice and Peace Netherlands, thus 
illustrating the circulation of personnel among TANs (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 92). Regarding its other 
project, "The Hague Training Course for HRDs on Security", JP is also fueling the transnational network 
by bringing together HRDs from all over the world, not only as trainees but also as trainers, for instance 
inviting a Ukrainian expert in psychological security and a Pakistani expert in digital security to train in 
June 2016. 
Justice and Peace is constantly making use of this network in various aspect of its work. When 
the nominations for the Human Rights Tulip award were opened in May 2016, Justice and Peace shared 
the information with an extensive list of human rights NGOs, but also with former participants of Shelter 
City and The Hague Training Course. Many of these local and often isolated HRDs would probably not 
have accessed this information otherwise. 
                                                     
3 ‘HRD Hub, The University of York’. 2016. York.ac.uk. https://www.york.ac.uk/cahr/hrd-hub/ (June 3, 2016). 
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Justice and Peace not only shares information within its network of local HRDs, but also collects 
information from them. According to Keck and Sikkink's "typology of the kinds of tactics" used by 
TANs, this activity falls within "information politics", which is "the ability to move politically usable 
information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95). 
Thanks to the links that JP maintains with the participants of Shelter City and The Hague Training 
Course, a considerable amount of invaluable information on the situation of HRDs worldwide is 
available to the organisation. As observed by Keck and Sikkink, digital communication allows 
information to be transmitted from small organisations in the global South to large western NGOs in a 
direct and almost immediate way, regardless of national borders and governments (1999, 96). Moreover, 
both sides benefit from these channels of communication: "Forging links with local organizations allows 
groups to receive and monitor information from many countries at low cost. Local groups, in turn, 
depend on international contacts to get their information out, and to help to protect them in their work." 
(Ibid.). 
It is not uncommon for Justice and Peace to hear from HRDs who previously took part in JP 
activities and who rely on JP to make use of the information they provide in a way that will improve 
their situation. For example, on the 20th of May 2016, Justice and Peace posted on its website and 
Facebook page the following message: "Justice and Peace urges the government of Somaliland to restore 
his license to human rights lawyer and former #ShelterCity participant Guleid Jama and stop obstructing 
his work as a human rights defender".4 This kind of personalised information coming directly from the 
field makes JP's message even more powerful. Indeed, Keck and Sikkink explain that "information flows 
in advocacy networks provide not only facts, but also testimonies – stories told by people whose lives 
have been affected" (1999, 95). This type of information is particularly persuasive because it strikes the 
audiences' emotions and values, and "helps to make the need for action more real for ordinary citizens" 
(96). JP's communication officers also try to "package their information in a timely and dramatic way 
to draw press attention" (Ibid.). Last April, Justice and Peace obtained a double page in the Dutch 
                                                     
4 ‘Licentie Ingetrokken van Advocaat En Voormalig Shelter City Gast Guleid’. 2016. Shelter City. 
http://www.sheltercity.nl/licentie-ingetrokken-van-advocaat-en-voormalig-shelter-city-gast-guleid/ (March 6, 
2016). 
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national newspaper AD featuring interviews and portraits of the HRDs currently relocated in Shelter 
Cities. 
Nonetheless, the director and the lobbyist of Justice and Peace recently realised that they were 
not always able to move this information "quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact" 
(Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95). They have a massive collection of subjective testimonies, but they lack 
technical and statistical information. As underlined by Keck and Sikkink, "linkage of the two is crucial" 
(96) to build a convincing advocacy message. Therefore, they decided to develop a research project 
aiming at processing the information provided by HRDs in a systematic way. Last January, two research 
interns from the University of Maastricht started working on the design of a questionnaire that will be 
used to collect data from HRDs. The final purpose of this project is to create a "Human Rights Defenders 
Index" documenting the situation of HRDs in various regions of the world. This would be of great help 
to identify the key problems faced by HRDs in specific contexts, and to develop an effective frame to 
"show that a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental, identify the responsible party or 
parties, and propose credible solutions" (Ibid.). 
The second tactic in Keck and Sikkink's typology, symbolic politics, is "the ability to call upon 
symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far 
away" (1999, 95). This tactic is particularly relevant to our field, since HRDs can easily be presented as 
heroes and serve as symbols of the cause they fight for. For example Berta Caceres – the Honduran 
indigenous leader and environmental defender who has been assassinated in March – has become a 
symbol of the persecution of HRDs as a result of the circulation of her story through the entire 
transnational network for the protection of HRDs. Most actors of the network reacted publicly to this 
information, not only human rights NGOs but also diplomats and other official representatives. The UN 
Special Rapporteur on HRDs issued a public statement urging the Government of Honduras to set up an 
independent investigation, and "to express publicly its full support for the legitimate work of human 
rights defenders in general and to take measures to ensure a safe environment for defenders" (OHCHR 
2016). 
16 
 
Human rights awards are another way to create symbols. Malala Yousafzai, the young Pakistani 
activist who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014, has become a symbol of the struggle for female 
education in conservative societies. Keck and Sikkink explain that sometimes it is "the juxtaposition of 
disparate events that makes people change their minds and take action" (1999, 97). That is the reason 
why Justice and Peace chose to strategically combine two public events they organize – the presentation 
of the Human Rights Tulip laureate and the Human Rights Ball – with a very symbolic date, the 9th of 
December – International Human Rights Defenders Day. 
Leverage politics, which is the "ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where 
weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95), can also be 
very useful for the protection of HRDs. JP's Connect2Protect initiative is based on this idea: an isolated 
human rights defender is twinned with a person with significant resources or power and similar values 
– a Dutch or European politician, lawyer, etc. If the HRD is in trouble, he or she can turn to this person 
for help. In the case of Berta Caceres, her family used leverage politics when they submitted the situation 
to the Organisation of American States via an open letter. Their call for help was answered by Michel 
Forst, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of HRDs, who used his position to put pressure on the 
Government of Honduras to take action (OHCHR 2016). Michel Forst used moral leverage to generate 
a "mobilisation of shame" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97) on the Government of Honduras by mentioning 
the multiple "assassinations of human rights defenders in Honduras in recent months" (OHCHR 2016). 
Finally, the opportunities to use accountability politics in the field of HRD protection are quite 
limited. Indeed, accountability politics is the "effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer 
policies or principles they formally endorsed" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95). As mentioned before, all 
UN member states formally endorsed the declaration on HRDs, which makes it difficult to denounce 
the behaviour of one particular state on the grounds that they made this commitment – almost all states 
did, and yet so many others do not comply. However, accountability politics becomes an interesting tool 
when governments enact laws specifically protecting HRDs, as Mexico and Côte d'Ivoire did in 2012 
and 2014 respectively (Bennett et al. 2015, 885). In 2015, Justice and Peace Netherlands supported local 
civil society organisations in their claim for the adoption of such a law at the provincial level in Eastern 
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Congo (Justice and Peace Netherlands 2015). They succeeded in February 2016, when the Governor of 
the province of South Kivu promulgated an edict on the protection of HRDs and journalists (Protection 
International 2016). Although there is a well-known gap in Congo between law and practice, this edict 
provides a basis to conduct accountability politics, and to lobby for the adoption of a similar law at the 
national level (Ibid.). 
Therefore, the structure and the tactics of TANs as defined by Keck and Sikkink can undeniably 
be observed in the field of HRD protection, especially when taking a close look at the work of one NGO 
in particular – Justice and Peace Netherlands. The question that remains to be asked is whether these 
tactics succeed in effectively protecting HRDs. 
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The limitations of transnational advocacy 
To assess the impact of TANs, Keck and Sikkink distinguish five "stages of network influence" 
(1999, 98). The first stage is "issue creation and attention/agenda setting" (Ibid.). Evidence of the 
achievement of this stage can be found in the existence of an international protection regime for HRDs 
(Bennett et al. 2015). Indeed, an international regime shows that the issue has successfully emerged as 
a matter of public debate. The challenge for the transnational advocacy network working on the 
protection of HRDs was to convince the general public and powerful actors that this cause differs from 
the promotion and the protection of human rights in general, and that, as such, this issue deserves 
particular attention. Indeed, Bennett et al. explain that the international protection regime for HRDs is 
"goal-driven" – its aim is not to defend values (these would be the same humanitarian values as those of 
any other human rights activist), but "to protect and support defenders who operate in their own contexts 
in the face of threats and risks" (Bennett et al. 2015, 884). 
Keck and Sikkink's second stage is the "influence on discursive positions of states and regional 
and international organizations" (1999, 98). Again, there is much evidence that the TAN for the 
protection of HRDs succeeded in reaching this level of influence. To influence discursive positions 
means "to persuade states and international organizations to support international declarations or change 
stated domestic policy positions" (Ibid.). In this sense, the adoption of the UN declaration on HRDs by 
the UN General Assembly and the creation of an official position dedicated to HRDs – the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of HRDs – were great achievements, the result of over 15 years of 
negotiations (Bennett et al. 2015, 883). Moreover, the introduction of the issue of HRD protection in the 
discourse of certain states is clearly visible in the frame of the Universal Periodic Review, a mechanism 
of the UN Human Rights Council in which any state can formulate recommendations to any other state 
(among UN member states) on how to improve their human rights situation domestically. During the 
first cycle of the UPR (2008-2012), 327 recommendations focused on the issue of human rights 
defenders (Database on the Universal Periodic Review recommendations and voluntary pledges). 
Although the recommendations are formulated by states, the issues they choose to focus on are highly 
dependent on the advocacy work undertaken by civil society organisations. For example, one of the 
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countries who expressed the highest number of recommendations on HRDs is Ireland (24 
recommendations), which happens to be where Front Line Defenders – the first NGO focusing 
exclusively on HRDs – is based. "Support for human rights defenders" is also one of the top priorities 
of the human rights strategy of The Netherlands (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, 1). Indeed, 
there is a policy officer within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who works specifically on HRDs. 
For Justice and Peace, it is vital that The Netherlands maintain this discursive position in order to secure 
funding for all its project related to HRDs. 
The next stage of network influence is the "influence on institutional procedures" (Keck and 
Sikkink 1999, 98). A good example of this is the advocacy efforts of the transnational network for HRDs 
to obtain simplified and effective procedures for the issuance of visas for HRDs at risk who need to be 
relocated. In 2004, the Irish government in collaboration with Front Line Defenders established a 
"Facilitated Visa Procedure for HRDs" based on a "fast-track approach to processing applications" 
(Front Line Defenders 2008, 6). In 2012, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in its action 
plan that it will "facilitate the expedited issue of Schengen short-stay visas for human rights defenders 
in distress who are seeking a temporary stay in the Netherlands" (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
2012, 5). Currently, several organisations in Europe are lobbying EU institutions for the creation of a 
special visa regime for HRDs at risk. Indeed, this is one of the main project that the lobbyist of JP is 
currently working on. In a guidance note shared internally in April 2016, the main elements of the 
demanded visa regime are stated as follows: "(1) the visa can be delivered through a special fast-track 
procedure in a short period of time; (2) the visa is valid for a one to three years, renewable, for multiple 
entries; (3) the visa scheme is explicitly stated in EU and Member States policy documents and thereby 
make it predictable and reliable." During the Defenders' Days in Stockholm, JP staff could then share 
this view with other actors of the transnational network and discuss the possibilities for further 
collaboration on this advocacy project. 
Regarding the "influence on policy change in 'target actors' which may be states, international 
or regional organizations, or private actors" – Keck and Sikkink's (1999, 98) fourth stage of influence – 
the achievements of the TAN for the protection of HRDs are much more limited. It is true that the 
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network's advocacy efforts have had a real impact on international and regional organisations. For 
example, on the 18th of November 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution 
"recognizing the role of human rights defenders and the need for their protection". During the 
negotiation process, the Africa group tabled 39 amendments undermining the text, but finally withdrew 
them after a group of over 150 NGOs issued an "open letter calling on all States to stand with human 
rights defenders and reject the amendments" (International Service for Human Rights 2015). However, 
the influence of NGOs on states is much lesser outside of the frame of international organisations. As 
mentioned before, very few states have changed their domestic policy in order to guarantee the effective 
protection of HRDs (Bennett et al. 2015, 5), and especially not the governments who persecute HRDs, 
although they should be the TAN's "target actors". 
The last stage, "influence on state behaviour", is the most difficult to fulfill. Indeed there is no 
clear evidence that transnational advocacy networks have led repressive governments to start respecting 
the rights of HRDs. Although Keck and Sikkink affirm that "meaningful policy and behavioural change 
is more likely when the first three types or stages of impact have occurred" (1999, 98), in the case of 
HRD protection, the emergence of an international protection regime for HRDs did not lead to 
significant improvements in the effective situation of HRDs on the ground. As observed by Bennett et 
al., "defenders continue to be attacked, even in countries where they have legally enforceable rights to 
promote and protect human rights" (2015, 886). According to Front Line Defenders' annual report, there 
was a new increase both in the number of HRDs killed and the number of countries concerned in 2015 
(Front Line Defenders 2016, 7). As governments can no longer openly deny HRDs' rights, they adapt 
their discourse and find other justifications for the restriction of human rights work, presenting it as 
"measures to protect national sovereignty; counter terrorism and extremism; further economic security 
and development; and assert particular cultural, traditional and religious norms and practices" (Bennett 
et al. 2015, 886). For example, India and Pakistan passed laws severely limiting NGOs that receive 
foreign funding (Ibid.; Nah et al. 2013, 409) and in Russia, many human rights and environmental NGOs 
are labelled as "foreign agents" under the law (Front Line Defenders 2016, 7). 
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 The advocacy work undertaken by the transnational networks for the protection of HRDs is 
absolutely essential to create awareness of the issue, to highlight the need for international protection 
mechanisms, and to maintain the issue on the agenda of powerful actors (Lawlor and Anderson 2014, 
366). However, when it comes to effectively protecting HRDs on the ground, the relevance and impact 
of the use of advocacy seems questionable. 
 First, it is not so easy to change the mind of perpetrators. A repressive government might agree 
to release an imprisoned human rights activist who benefitted from international support, but this does 
not mean that it will from now on respect the rights of all other human rights defenders. Hafner-Burton 
studied the impact of 'naming and shaming' campaigns on governments' human rights practices, and 
found that "governments put in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations 
afterward, while reducing others" (2008, 689). Noakes (2012) showed that in extreme cases, the 
inflexible attitude of their target can lead transnational advocacy networks to scale down their claim. 
For example, the initial goal of the "free Tibet" transnational campaign, which was to obtain 
independence, was later replaced by a claim for the recognition of the Tibetan people's cultural and 
political rights within the Chinese state, and this "as a result of Chinese intransigence" (Noakes 2012, 
508). 
 A further reason why advocacy is not always the most appropriate tool to protect HRDs is the 
risk that it entails for their security. Indeed, putting pressure on perpetrators of abuse against HRDs, and 
especially denouncing this behaviour publicly, can have two types of (opposite) consequences. In some 
cases, "increased visibility and national/international recognition of the work of an individual HRD or 
organization has been seen to contribute to a stronger profile reducing the risk of intimidation and attack 
for fear of a strong response by various stakeholders nationally and internationally" (East and Horn of 
Africa Human Rights Defenders Project 2013, 529–530). On the other hand, publicly promoting the 
work of an HRD can put him or her at risk of being targeted by the government or other hostile actors. 
Similarly, seeking external support through advocacy can cause the HRD to suffer "acts of reprisal or 
intimidation" (Ibid.). Even when the advocacy work is conducted through "quiet diplomacy" (Nah et al. 
2013, 412), meaning without public visibility, it is not always in the best interest of the HRDs involved. 
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According to the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, EU delegations in foreign 
countries, in compliance with the EU Guidelines on HRDs, sometimes undertake such demarches 
without even consulting – or providing feedback to – the HRD concerned or the local organisations 
which are already working on this case (2006, 4). 
 This lack of communication is linked to a larger problem undermining the efficiency of 
transnational advocacy – the fact that it can be so disconnected from the reality of HRDs on the ground. 
The creation of an international protection regime for HRDs is presented as a great progress for the 
rights of HRDs worldwide and yet, many of them are not even aware of its existence. In the form that 
applicants for The Hague Training Course fill in, Justice and Peace asks if they know about international 
protection mechanisms such as the UN declaration and EU guidelines, and if they have ever used or 
referred to one of them in their work. The majority of applicants answer no to both of these questions. 
Both the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (2006) and Bennett (2015) made a 
similar observation regarding the EU Guidelines on HRDs. There is a serious lack of awareness of the 
content and usefulness of the guidelines not only among HRDs, but also among EU diplomats who are 
supposed to implement them (Bennett 2015, 913; Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights 
Defenders 2006, 2). The local organisations and HRDs who are familiar with these mechanisms are the 
ones who regularly engage with international actors and events (Observatory for the Protection of 
Human Rights Defenders 2006, 3), which is not the case for the vast majority of HRDs around the world. 
Isolated HRDs, often working in remote areas, rarely have access to any support or protection (Bennett 
2015, 917), and especially do not benefit from advocacy campaigns which typically focus on high-
profile HRDs and prominent cases of abuse. 
 In light of all the arguments presented above, transnational advocacy has not proven to be the 
most appropriate tool to effectively support HRDs in need of protection. According to Bennett et al., 
"there is sometimes a gap between what defenders do and how transnational actors understand and 
support them, which can lead to ineffective protection and support measures" (Bennett et al. 2015, 890). 
The solution might then be to better consider the actual needs of HRDs on the ground when designing 
the content and conditions of international support (Nah et al. 2013, 413). 
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International NGOs adapting to the needs of local HRDs: From emergency 
support to structural empowerment 
 According to Bennett et al., the international protection regime for HRDs is based on a "Human 
Security Paradigm" which focuses on the security of "individuals, groups and communities" as opposed 
to national security (2015, 884). Therefore, who knows best how the security of individual HRDs can 
be improved than individual HRDs themselves? This is the approach adopted by Front Line Defenders 
according to its founder Mary Lawlor. Their work is based on the idea that HRDs are "the most expert 
in the situation they are facing and the situation on the ground that they are trying to alleviate" (Lawlor 
and Anderson 2014, 365). Lawlor even adds: "So why would you try to barge in, instead of supporting 
them to do their work?" (Ibid.). In the chapter "How can HRDs be supported and protected in their 
work?" of Fact Sheet 29 (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2004, 28–37), the 
longest section is not "Action by States", nor "Action by non-State actors", nor "Action by United 
Nations departments, offices and programmes", but rather "Action by human rights defenders" 
themselves. In this sense, it seems more productive for international human rights NGOs to support 
HRDs in a way that enables them to take action for their own security, rather than working to convince 
or oblige states to take action for someone else, especially considering that these NGOs can be in direct 
contact with local HRDs thanks to TANs. Based on the information collected from HRDs on the ground, 
international NGOs can design projects and tools that directly respond to the demand of local HRDs. 
Fernandez and Patel, who sought to develop a "critical and ethical approach for better recognising and 
protecting human rights defenders", posited an "approach in which the defender is understood, and 
constructed, as a relational agent situated in human rights work" (2015, 896). They insist on the 
importance of considering the context of human rights practice rather than blindly applying universal 
principles and standards (904). Indeed, there are numerous ways in which HRDs can be offered support 
or protection, and none of them can be deemed generally efficient or inefficient – it all depends on the 
context in which it is used and the specific needs of its recipient. 
 The East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project (2013) distinguishes two different 
types of needs, which call for two different types of intervention. The first type of protection is reactive, 
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and entails "responding to cases of threats and attacks against HRDs as they arise" (East and Horn of 
Africa Human Rights Defenders Project 2013, 528). The second type of protection is preventive, and 
entails "working with HRDs to manage their own security proactively, both before, during, and after the 
incident of an attack" (Ibid.). 
 Reactive protection measures include for example advocacy work – exposing the situation faced 
by an HRD in order to generate public support, bring shame on the perpetrator, and/or compel powerful 
actors to take action. However, as underlined by Nah et al., "in ideal circumstances, these tactics are 
used in close consultation and collaboration with HRDs themselves" (2013, 412). Sometimes it is not 
necessary or relevant to expose the HRD to so much attention, and in some cases it can even be 
counterproductive. Some HRDs at risk only need to be able to afford legal assistance, medical treatment 
or security cameras (Lawlor and Anderson 2014, 367). In such cases, an emergency grant can perfectly 
respond to the immediate needs. In other cases, it's the isolation in which they work that constitutes a 
danger for HRDs. International accompaniment is a strategy developed by the international NGO Peace 
Brigades International to respond to such situations. International volunteers are sent to spend several 
months with HRDs on the field to "provide moral support to HRDs, witness any acts of aggression 
against them and highlight these violations to the international community who in turn put pressure on 
perpetrators" (Nah et al. 2013, 412). This tactic allows HRDs to continue their work in safer conditions. 
Sometimes, the threats are so severe that the HRD is forced to get away from the danger. The most 
appropriate response might then be "temporary international relocation" (Jones 2015), either in a 
neighbouring country as it is offered by the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project, 
or in a totally different region of the world as it is offered by JP's Shelter City Initiative in the 
Netherlands. Both organisations recently decided to collaborate in order to ensure that HRDs are offered 
the best possible solution according to their specific needs. 
 Preventive protection measures focus on "security management", for instance to "help HRDs to 
identify resources, allies and foes, and assist them in security planning in order to minimize risks and 
mitigate/prevent the negative impact of an attack" (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders 
Project 2013, 528). The idea is to empower local HRDs or organisations in a way that will allow them 
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to be more secure in the long term. This is something that transnational advocacy networks failed to do 
according to Rodrigues (2011). Indeed, he observed that once advocacy campaigns set up by both 
international and local NGOs come to an end, local NGOs have rarely been empowered in the process, 
and are more or less abandoned by international network members. By raising awareness among HRDs 
of the risks they face and the rights they have, by teaching them how to better protect themselves, and 
by offering them opportunities to expand their network transnationally, international NGOs can have a 
lasting impact on HRDs' security. Justice and Peace, through its training programme 'The Hague 
Training Course for Human Rights Defenders on Security', seeks to combine all these aspects of 
protection. In the selection process, JP targets grassroots HRDs with few resources and little 
international support – in other words, those who will gain the most from such an experience. They are 
trained on physical, psychological and digital security, as well as international protection mechanisms, 
and advocacy and policy influencing techniques. Being in The Hague is also a unique opportunity for 
these isolated HRDs to expand their transnational network, meeting other HRDs from other parts of the 
world, but also getting acquainted with key actors and institutions – NGOs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, International Criminal Court, etc. These contacts can prove to be crucial in the future when they 
need international support. 
 Another essential feature of 'The Hague Training Course' is that the trainees commit to share 
the knowledge and skills gained with other HRDs in their own country or region. They are supposed to 
organise at least one local training for their colleagues and/or other local organisations on the 
components of 'The Hague Training Course'' that most apply to their own context and needs. Through 
this process, the HRDs make the training their own and act as translators – literally or symbolically, 
bridging the gap between "the worlds of transnational human rights and local cultural practices" (Merry 
2006, 38). Involving individual HRDs as actors of their own protection and that of their peers reinforces 
their confidence and sense of ownership (Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders 
2006, 4). Furthermore, this process of re-training has a multiplier effect – if the 20 participants of 'The 
Hague Training Course' each train 10 of their colleagues, 200 defenders have already been reached, and 
this logic goes on and on as each trainee becomes a trainer for others. 
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The use of preventive protection measures by international NGOs is in fact a long-term 
investment in human rights in general. Indeed, empowering local HRDs is an indirect but fruitful way 
to promote human rights 'from the inside'. HRDs are not only "key interlocutors in the diffusion of 
human rights norms from global spaces to local realities" (Fernández and Patel 2015, 898), they are "key 
agents of change" in their local contexts (Bennett et al. 2015, 884). For instance, Meernik et al. (2012) 
found that a human rights situation is more likely to draw the attention of the international community 
– and particularly of international NGOs conducting advocacy – if there are local human rights 
organisations working to raise the alarm from the bottom up. Therefore, protecting local defenders 
generates a virtuous circle, as better protected HRDs will be more able to defend human rights in their 
country, and progress of human rights in the country will in turn reduce aggression against local 
defenders. 
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Conclusion 
 The protection of human rights defenders is an emerging but fast-growing field of human rights 
work, which relies entirely on transnational communication. Indeed, all kinds of information on abuses 
against HRDs but also on protection tools and tactics, as well as mobile staff and HRDs at risk 
themselves, are constantly circulating across borders. These movements are what gives shape to a 
worldwide community of human rights defenders sharing the same goals and values. 
 From this perspective, the theory of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998) 
is very useful to understand the structure and functioning of the transnational network for the protection 
of HRDs. Nonetheless, Keck and Sikkink's exclusive focus on advocacy as the only purpose served by 
TANs is inconsistent with the use that human rights NGOs make of such networks in practice. Indeed, 
the observation of the daily work of an NGO focusing on the security of human rights defenders – Justice 
and Peace Netherlands – has revealed that advocacy is not the only way to achieve positive results for 
HRDs at risk. It is one tactic among others, which can have a crucial role in setting the issue of HRD 
security as part of the global human rights agenda, but which can also have adverse consequences when 
it comes to the effective protection of HRDs on the ground. As has been demonstrated, there are many 
ways in which international NGOs can provide direct support to local HRDs without resorting to states, 
and with a more significant impact on their security in the long term. The 'Shelter City Initiative' and 
'The Hague Training Course' project both set up by Justice and Peace are only two examples of how 
international NGOs can respond to the practical needs of HRDs at risk. 
 The problem with Keck and Sikkink's theory might be that it is already dated. Human rights 
work has considerably changed since 1998. Based on the example of Amnesty International, Rodio and 
Schmitz show how transnational human rights activism "has evolved slowly from a largely reactive 
practice of publishing reports about abuses and writing letters to a more proactive approach addressing 
some of the structural root causes of many gross violations" (2010, 443). Keck and Sikkink's view on 
transnational networks of activists might have been accurate in their own context, but it would need to 
be updated in order to reflect today's human rights practice. 
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